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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
FRANK RIGGLE and GENEVA

H. RIGGLE, his wife,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
DAINES MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.

10948

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiffs sued on a promissory note, and in
defense the Defendant pleaded usury, failure of
consideration and denied the amount of attorneys'
fees to be allowed, if any. (R. 1 & 35-36)
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court, the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, Judge, pursuant to a motion by Plaintiffs,
granted summary judgement as prayed against the
Defendant on the promissory note, together with
attorney's fees and costs. (R. 26, 45)
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and Appellant here in seeks a reversal of the summary judgment and a directive
that the trial court hear the appellant's defense of
usury, failure of consideration and amount of attol'neys' fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a smnmary judgment.
The defenses of usury and want of consideration
to the promissory note pleaded by the Defendant
were not tried. Judgment was awarded on Plaintiffs' pleadings and Pla~ntiffs' affidavit. The Defendant by its pleadings and affidavit placed in
issue its defenses of usury and want of consideration as aforesaid ( R. 18-21).

On June 8, 1954, the Defendant's predecessor,
a partnership consisting of R. M. Daines, R. D.
Daines and J. Norman Daines, borrowed $10,000.00 '
from the Plaintiffs, for which the partnership gave
a promissory note of $10,000.00, with interest at
the rate of six per cent per annum. As additional
consideration for the loan, the makers of said promissory note executed an employment contract with
the Plaintiff Frank Riggle, under the terms of
which Frank Riggle was employed for a period of
five years at an annual compensation of $1,800.00.
Thereafter the partnership organized the defendant
corporation as the partnership's successor, and it
was substituted as a party under the employment
2

conti·act. The note herein sued on was for payments
due under the employment contract (R. 18-21, 47).
Prior to the incorporation of the defendant on
January 18, 1955, said R. D. Daines, R. M. Daines
and J. Norman Daines had been engaged in the
manufacture and sale of store appliances at Logan,
Utah. They were the incorporators of the Defendant
corporation ( R. 18-21). The Plaintiff Frank Riggle
was engaged in Ogden, Utah, in the business of
sharpening saws under the name of Overnight Saw
Service ( R. 18-21).
The Plaintiffs in support of their motion for
summary judgment filed an affidavit (R. 11-17).
The Defendant filed a counter-affidavit ( R. 18-21).
Plaintiffs' affidavit included the employment contract dated July 1, 1955 between Plaintiff Frank
Riggle and the Defendant, which among other
things, set forth that for a period of four years Defendant would pay him for his services as a business
and enginee:: ing consultant the sum of $150.00 per
month, with additional compensation of $50.00 per
clay for such time in excess of three days per month
that he spent at Defendant's place of business in
Logan, Utah (R. 11-17). Also, Plaintiffs' affidavit
set forth as Exhibit "C" employment receipts from
Daines Manufacturing Company covering the period of September 1, 1954 to October 31, 1956 (R.
14-15). Plaintiffs alleged that on August 1, 1959,
the Defendant was delinquent in its payments in
the amount of $1,050.00 and that the note sued on
0
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was given in payment of the delinquency, with a
further agreement that if the note was paid promptly, he, Frank Riggle, would waive any future s~l
ary claim under the contract (R. 11, 12).
Prior to the Defendant's incorporation, one of
the partners, R. M. Daines, took saws to the Plaintiff for sharpening. During the conversation he
told Plaintiff Frank Riggle that Defendant was
going to incorporate their business to enable them
to sell stock to obtain additional capital. The Plaintiff Frank Riggle replied that he had some money
to invest and invited R. M. Daines to dis2uss the
matter with him later. Several meetings were held
and in the month of June, 1954, when all of thi:
three partners were present, the Plaintiff Frank
Riggle told them that he had decided he did not
want to buy stock of the corporation being formed;
that he was only interested in a sure thing and an
investment that would return to him more than the
legal rate of interest, and if a satisfadory arrangement could be worked out by which he could double
his money, he would be willing to lend the corporation $10,000.00 ( R. 18-20).
The affidavit also sets forth:
"* * * The Plaintiff Frank Riggle suggested that a note for the $10,000.00, with
interest at six per cent, could be signed and,
in addition, the corporation would employ the
Plaintiff Frank Riggle to sweep the floor
once or twice a year; that this way Plaintiff
Frank Riggle could double his money by the
4

time the note was paid off, if the corporation
paid him a salary of $1,800.00 a year for a
period of five years.
. "That pursuant to said arrangement, the
said note was executed and signed by the
three officers, and a written con tract of employment was entered into by and between
the Plaintiff Frank Riggle and the three officers, still doing business as a partnership,
which employment contract has been lost;
that at the time of this meeting it was agreed
that both the note and the employment contract would be('.ome obligations of the corporation when the corporate organization was
completed, and that payments of interest on
th'3 note and payments under the employment
contract were made by the defendant corporation and the officers as a partnership, and
accepted by the Plaintiff Frank Riggle prior
to incorporation, and after incorporation;
that subsequently Defendant corporation was
incorporated under the laws of the State of
Utah, and a certificate of incorporation was
issued on the 18th day of January, 1955.
That after incorporation a new contract of
employment was entered into by and between
the Plaintiff Frank Riggle and the Defendant corporation covering the same terms
and conditions as that entered into between
the Plaintiff Frank Riggle and the three officers of the corpora ti on prior to incorporation; that the Plaintiff Frank Riggle suggested that the employment contract recite
that the Plaintiff Frank Riggle was to furnish business and engineering consultation as
a way of justifying his employment; th~t the
Plaintiff Frank Riggle, as aforement10ned,
was engaged in the saw sharpening business
5

in Ogden, Utah, and that the defendant corvoration place of business was at Logan,
Utah, and that at no time has the Plaintiff
performed any service under the employment
contract. That the Plaintiff Frank Riggle
doing business as Overnight Saw Service, dicl
sharpen saws for the Denfandants, for which
he was paid separately and apart from the
employment contract. That independent of
the money paid by the defendant corpm'ation
and the partnership prior to incorporation,
paid the Plaintiff Frank Riggle the sum of
$9,612.58. That a promissory note in the sum
of $1,050.00, which is the subject of this action, was delivered to the Plaintiff Frank
Riggle for back salary under the aforementioned employment contract, which sum is included in the $9,612.58 above.
''That the Plantiff Frank Riggle has
never performed any service of the defendant
corporation except the sharpening of saws, as
aforementioned, and the exe'.:ution of said
employment contract was rne1'ely a devlse to
evade the usury Jaws of the State of Utah
and to provide Plaintiff Frank Riggle ·with
a greater rate of interest than legally allowed." (R. 18-21)
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
PL A I N T I F F S' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. DEFENDANT RAISED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT - USURY AND FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, WHICH CAN
ONLY BE DETERMINED BY A TRIAL.

The law is plain that a summary judgment
6

should not be granted if there is any genuine issue
tu be tried. The Court made Findings of Fact which
necessitated weighing the conflicting allegations of
the two affidavits. Such findings were made although no evidence has ever been received upon
these conflicting allegations (R. 46-48, R. 11-17, R.

18-21).

As stated in Young vs. Felornia, (Utah) 244
P. 2d 862, 121 Utah 646:
"In respect to a summary judgment,
Rule 56 ( c) U.R.C.P. provides: 'The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no g·enuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment, as a matter of law.'
"Under this rule, it is clear that if there
is any genuine issue as to any material fact,
the motion should be denied."
Not only is this the rule, but it is also the rule
that every inference fairly arising from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits is to
be given in favor of the one against whom the motion for summary judgment is asked.
As this court stated in Morris vs. Farnsworth
Motel, et al, 259 P. 2d 297, 123 Utah 289:
"Under such circumstances, the party
against whom the summary ~udgment. is
granted is entitled to the benefit of haVIng
the Court consider all of the facts presented
and every inference fairly arising therefrom
7

in the light most favorable to him, which we
do in reviewing the incident."
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN HOLDING THAT
DEFENDANT'S PLEADINGS AND AFFIDAVIT DID NOT PRESENT AN ISSUE OF
USURY FOR THE DETERMINATION OF A
TRIER OF THE FACTS.

The case involves a promissory note which was
executed on the first day of August, 1957, by the
Defendant, payable to the Plaintiffs for the amount
of $1,050.00 principal and ten per cent interest. The
complaint alleges that there is unpaid $344.49 and
prays judgment for that amount, together with interest from February 11, 1958, together with attorneys' fees.
Another case No. 155799 involves a promissory
note for the amount of $10,000.00 executed July 8,
1954, by Daines Manufacturing Company, a partnership, D. R. Daines, R. M. Daines, and J. Norman Daines, to the Plaintiffs, Frank Riggle and
Geneva H. Riggle, his wife.
As set forth in the affidavit of Darrel R.
Daines, one of the Defendants, before the Plaintiffs
loaned $10,000.00 to the Defendant, it was agreed
by and between the parties that the Defendant
would pay an additional $150.00 per month for a
period of five years to the Plaintiffs as an inducement for the loan, for which the note of $10,000.00
8

' was given and a contract of employment was entered into by and between the Plaintiff Frank Riggle
and the three members of the partnership, D. R.
Daines, R. M. Daines and J. Norman Daines (R.
19). Said employment contract was entered into
for the purpose of evading the usury laws, as the
amount thus paid was not for any service to be rendered by the Plaintiff (R. 20).
The note which is the subject of the action before the Court was given in the amount of $1,050.00
because the Defendant had failed to pay seven installments of $150.00 each on the employment contract. As stated in the affidavit above mentioned
of Darrel R. Daines:
"The promissory note in the sum of $1,050.00, which is the subject of this action, was
delivered to the Plaintiff Frank Riggle, for
back salary under the aforementioned employment contract, which sum is included in the
$9,612.58 above." (R. 20)
The $9,612.58 "mentioned above" was payment
made by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs.
Said affidavit further states:
"That the Plaintiff Frank Riggle has
never performed any service for the .defendant corporation, except the sharpenmg of
saws as aforementioned (for which he was
paid separately), and the execution of. said
employment contract was merely a device to
evade the usury laws of the State ?f Uta~ and
to provide the Plaintiff Frank Riggle with a
9

greater rate of interest than legally allowed."
(R. 20)
After delivery of the $10,000.00 note and the
contract of employment by Daines Manufacturing
Company, a partnership, and the three named partners, in (Case No. 155799 Salt Lake County District
court), the said defendants incorporated the business as Daines Manufacturing Company, and the
Defendant Daines Manufacturing Company was
substituted as the employer in the new contract upon
the same terms and conditions for the purpose of
securing the Plaintiffs' usurious interest.

The Defendant in this action submits that·
if the allegations of the affidavit of Darrel R.
Daines are true, the note of $1,050.00 sued on in
the action before the Court is for a usurious pay·
ment and is void and uncollectible. Thus, the truth
or falsity of the allegations of Darrel R. Daines in
said affidavit raise an issue which should be heard
by the Court and a summary judgment should not be
granted.
There are several items of law involved in this
matter upon which counsel will submit a few auth·
orities.
The original note given on July 8, 1954, would
be governed by the law relative to usury as of that
date, which reads:
''All bonds, bills, notes, assurances, con·
veyances, stock, pledges, mortgages and d~~ds
of trust and all other contracts and securities
whatso~ver, and all deposits of goods or other
10

thiJ?-gs whatsoever, whereon or whereby there
shall be reserved or taken or secured or
agreed to be reserved or taken or secJred
any greater sum or greater value for a loan'
?r for~earance of any money, goods or things
m act10n that as above prescribed shall be
void. Section 44-0-6, U.C.A., 1943."
Section 15-1-6, U.C.A., 1953, has this footnote:
"Repeal. This section (L. 1907, Ch 46.
Sec. 5; C.L. 1907, Sec. 1241 x3; C.L. 1917,
Sec. 3324; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 44-0-6) relating to the voiding of usurious contracts
and securities, was repealed by laws 1955 Ch.
21, Sec. 2."
Thus, the note given in 1954 was governed by
the law making usurious contracts void, which was
not repealed until 1955.
As stated in Richardson vs. Foster, 170 P. 321
(Wash.), a usurious obligation or loan, although
another debtor or security is added or substituted,
is nevertheless still usurious and does not eradicate
the usury.
In 55 Am. J ur. 390, Sec. 96, the rule is stated
as follows:
"Since the usurious character of a transaction is determined as of the date of its inception, if a contract is usurious in its inception no subsequent transaction will cure it.
Hen~e, where a usurious contract is renewed
by the giving of a renewal of substiuted contract the usury follows into and becomes a
part 'of the latter contract, making it subject
11

to the defense of usury to the same extent as
was the original obligation. The taint attaches to all consecutive obligations or securities growing out of the original usurious
transaction, and none of the descentant obligations, however remote, are free from it if
the descent can be traced.
"Although there is authority to the contrary, it is generally held that the mere fact
that a payment is made on a note or other obligation affected with usury and a new contract entered into for the balance due will not
purge the transaction of usury unless the
usurious feature is abandoned and the new
obligation is for a portion of the actual debt,
freed from all usurious considerations. Likewise, a change in the form of the contract or
a division of the original obligation into several notes or other contracts will not purge
the transaction of usury."
The note in the case before the Court is part of
the original usurious contract entered into on the
8th day of July, 1954.
As stated in Asperitia vs. California Tr1tSf
Company, (Calif.) 322 P. 2d 265:
"An obligation once usurious is always
usurious as long as its original existence con·
tinues.
"It is urged that payment to date .bY
Nordin did not constitute payment by plam·
tiffs. The court found the debt and the find·
ing is supported. Nordin testified he loaned
the money to plaintiff and he paid it to de·
fendant in their behalf. The effect of the
12

transaction was payment by plaintiffs to defendant. In fact, defendant in effect so concedes, for he says: 'It is the general rule of
law in the State of California that if someone
pays the usurious interest for and on behalf
of a borrower at the borrower's request, it
does not change the fact that usury has been
paid by the borrower direct. * * *
"The original agreement was null and
void as to the stipulation to pay interest."
In Westman vs. Dye, (California) 4 P. 2d 134,
Supreme Court of California, the following are several of the headnotes:
Headnote 4.
"Taint of usury in original usurious
transaction attached to all renewal notes;
hence, all payments tainted with usury could
be offset in action on last renewal note."
Headnote 6.
"Usurious character of contract is not
determined by amount of interest borrower
has paid, but amount of interest he has agreed
to pay on his indebtedness."
The affidavit of Frank Riggle supports the defendant's affidavit and position that the Defendant's predecessors, the Daines brothers partnership, had executed a prior employment contract
along with the $10,00.00 promissory note, a usurious transaction, as the payment receipts, shown as
part of his affidavit, reflect that he received so
called employment payments prior to the Defendant's incorporation, and the execution of the sub13

stituted employment agreement on July 1, 1955, as
the payments began September 1, 1954 and continuing throughout October 31, 1956.
The note sued on and contract of employment
was but an extension of the usurious business transaction entered into in 1954 in connection with the
loan of $10,000.00. (R. 11-17, R. 18-21)
Defendant's pleadings and affidavit put the
question of usury in issue, and it was a complete
defense to Plaintiffs' claim, and the motion for
Summary Judgment should have been denied.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES \VHERE THE
RIGHT AND AMOUNT WAS PUT IN ISSUE
BY THE PLEADING IN THE ABSENCE OF
ANY EVIDENCE.

There was no evidence, affidavits or otherwise,
in support of the award of attorneys' fees, and it is
elementary that the amount of attorneys' fees can
only be determined by the trier of the facts on evidence when it is put in issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out herein, Appellant re·
spectfully prays that the Court set aside the sum·
mary judgment and remand the cause for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
MOFFAT, IVERSON and TAYLOR
Attorneys for Appellant
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